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Resale Price Maintenance After Leegin: Why Treating 
Vertical Price-Fixing as ―Inherently Suspect‖  
Is the Only Viable Alternative to the  
Traditional Rule of Reason 
John Austin Moore  
INTRODUCTION 
At the close of the nineteenth century, there was growing concern 
across the United States about the expansion of major corporations 
and their potential for monopolization.
1
 In response, Senator John 
Sherman, an Ohio Republican and the chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, proposed that Congress codify English common 
law and protect citizens from arrangements
2
 that ―increase the price 
of articles, and . . . diminish the amount of commerce.‖3  
Although the Sherman Antitrust Act was designed to alleviate 
these early concerns, Congress gave the judiciary little direction 
about how the Act was to be enforced.
4
 Over the course of the last 
century, courts have determined that potential Sherman Act 
violations will either be declared illegal ―per se,‖ or examined by 
courts using a ―rule of reason.‖ The courts have struggled, however, 
 
  J.D. (2011), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2008), University of 
Mississippi. This Note is dedicated to my parents Terry and Robin for the wonderful example 
they set and their continued support. 
 1. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492–93 (1940) (The Sherman Act 
―was enacted in the era of ‗trusts‘ and of ‗combinations‘ of businesses and of capital organized 
and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods 
and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public concern.‖); see 
also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 346 (3d ed. 2005).  
 2. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW AND RELATED 
STATUTES: PART I THE ANTITRUST LAWS 19 (Earl W. Kitner ed., 1978) [hereinafter 1 THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].  
 3. 21 CONG. REC. 2462 (1890) (statement of S. John Sherman). 
 4. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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in determining which types of restraints deserve which analysis and 
ultimately how the rule of reason should be applied. 
In the 2007 case Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc.,
5
 the Supreme Court overturned ninety-six years of precedent and 
held that vertical resale price maintenance (―RPM‖), or a 
manufacturer setting the minimum price at which a distributor can 
resell its product, should no longer be held per se unlawful.
6
 Rather 
than instruct courts to examine RPM under the rule of reason as they 
have traditionally, however, the Leegin Court invited lower courts to 
establish a more ―fair and efficient‖ litigation structure for examining 
RPM.
7
 Although numerous litigation structures have been proposed 
since Leegin, this Note will argue that treating RPM as ―inherently 
suspect‖ is the only alternative that has a realistic possibility of 
affecting future adjudication.  
After giving a brief history of the Sherman Act, Part I of this Note 
will chronicle the birth of the rule of reason in the early 1900s, detail 
the rise of the per se rule in the mid-twentieth century, and describe 
how the rule of reason has been applied since the late 1970s.
8
 Part I 
will conclude by examining the language and rationale behind the 
Leegin decision. Parts II and III will discuss some of the inherent 
problems found in the traditional rule of reason and present the two 
post-Leegin standards that have the greatest possibility of influencing 
future judicial application of the rule of reason to RPM.
9
 Finally, Part 
IV will propose that the only alternative able to correct these 
problems and stand a realistic chance of being adopted by courts is 
treating RPM as ―inherently suspect.‖10 
I. HISTORY 
The Sherman Antitrust Act passed in 1890 with near unanimous 
support.
11
 Even with a motivated Congress, Senator Sherman 
 
 5. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 6. Id. at 881. 
 7. Id. at 898–99. 
 8. See infra Part I.  
 9. See infra Parts II–III.  
 10. See infra Part IV.  
 11. The Sherman Act passed the Senate by a vote of 52–1 on April 8, 1890, and the House 
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recognized that successful implementation of the Act would require 
significant judicial interpretation and involvement.
12
 This was 
especially true for section 1 of the Act, prohibiting ―[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.‖13  
It is no surprise, therefore, that the Supreme Court‘s varying 
interpretations of section 1 and adoption of different methods to 
examine section 1 claims over the past century has played a 
significant role in how the Act has been enforced. In 1890, for 
example, the Supreme Court adopted a strict, literal interpretation of 
the Sherman Act in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n.14  
In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that the regulation of 
transportation charges by an association of eighteen railroad 
companies violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.
15
 Rejecting the 
association‘s argument that section 1 applies only to those contracts 
found unreasonable at common law,
16
 the Court held that the plain 
 
of Representatives by a unanimous vote of 242–0 on June 20, 1890. See 21 CONG. REC. 3153, 
6314 (1890). President Benjamin Harrison signed the bill into law on July 2, 1890. See also 1 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 30. 
 12. In addressing fellow members of Congress, Senator Sherman stated, ―All that we, as 
lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will 
apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law . . . .‖ 21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) 
(statement of S. John Sherman). 
 13. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Congress has continually increased the 
fines and criminal penalties for Sherman Act violations over the past century. Originally those 
found guilty of a Sherman Act violation received a misdemeanor and faced up to a year in 
prison and/or a fine of up to $5,000. Pub. L. No. 51-647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890). Currently, the 
criminal penalties stand as a felony with up to ten years imprisonment and a fine up to $100 
million for corporations and $1 million for individuals. See 15 U.S.C § 1, amended by Antitrust 
Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 
665, 668 (2004). 
 14. 166 U.S. 290 (1896). 
 15. See id. at 340–42. 
 16. Id. at 327–28. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that: 
Contracts in restraint of trade have been known and spoken of for hundreds of years 
both in England and in this country, and the term includes all kinds of those contracts 
which in fact restrain or may restrain trade. . . . A contract may be in restraint of trade 
and still be valid at common law. 
Id. at 328. The Court also rejected the railroad association‘s argument that the Sherman Act was 
not meant to apply to railroads because of the substantial number of railroad regulations already 
in place. Id. at 326–27.  
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language of the Act expressly prohibits every restraint of trade, 
regardless of the restraint‘s treatment historically.17  
In a vigorous dissent, Justice White argued that because the prices 
agreed upon by the railroads were reasonable, the agreement satisfied 
the common law ―rule of reason‖ standard and should not be subject 
to section 1 condemnation.
18
 Although the Court backed off its strict 
interpretation in the years following Trans-Missouri,
19
 the Court did 
not officially overturn the decision until over a decade later.
20
 
Federal circuit courts also distanced themselves from the 
harshness of the Trans-Missouri decision. In United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
21
 the Sixth Circuit condemned a cartel of 
pipe manufacturers whose members intentionally overbid for 
municipality contracts to guarantee that the lowest bidder, also a 
member of the cartel, would receive the business at an inflated rate.
22
 
Although the arrangement did not violate the literal language of 
section 1, then-Judge (and future President and Supreme Court Chief 
Justice) William Howard Taft invoked common law principles to 
declare the cartel unlawful.
23
 Judge Taft distinguished between 
 
 17. Id. at 328. The Court concluded that ―[w]hen . . . the body of an act pronounces as 
illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade . . . the plain and ordinary meaning of 
such language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is . . . unreasonable.‖ Id. 
 18. Id. at 350–52 (White, J., dissenting). Although Justice White specifically used the 
phrase ―rule of reason‖ in his dissent, at least one commentator observed that at that time the 
phrase had a meaning entirely different from the modern standard. See ROBERT BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 24 (1978) (noting that White‘s use of rule of reason language was an 
―unfortunate choice of words‖). Justice White was particularly troubled by the effect the 
decision could have on freedom of contract:  
If the rule of reason no longer determines the right of the individual to contract, or 
secures the validity of contracts upon which trade depends and results, what becomes 
of the liberty of the citizen or of the freedom of trade? Secured no longer by the law of 
reason, all these rights become subject, when questioned, to the mere caprice of 
judicial authority.  
Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 355 (White, J., dissenting). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass‘n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (noting that 
―[t]o suppose . . . that the effect of the decision in the Trans-Missouri Case is to render illegal 
most business contracts or combinations . . . is to make a most violent assumption, and one not 
called for or justified by the decision mentioned, or by any other decision of this court‖). 
 20. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64–65 (1911). 
 21. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
 22. Id. at 292–94. 
 23. Id. at 286–92. The court noted that the common law had two concerns about restraints 
on trade: depriving a family and the public of a ―useful member,‖ and excluding others from 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/12
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―ancillary‖ restraints, those that serve a legitimate function and are 
essential to the purpose of the agreement,
24
 and ―naked‖ restraints, 
those with the ―sole object . . . to restrain trade in order to avoid . . . 
competition.‖25 Although the Supreme Court subsequently granted 
certiorari and affirmed Addyston,
26
 the majority made no mention of 
Judge Taft‘s ―ancillary restraints doctrine.‖27  
A. Birth of the Rule of Reason 
By 1911, newly-appointed Chief Justice White determined that 
under his watch the strict Trans-Missouri standard would no longer 
control Sherman Act adjudication.
28
 In Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States,
29
 the United States government charged John D. Rockefeller 
and his Standard Oil Company with a laundry list of discriminatory 
practices including forming contracts in restraint of trade, local price-
cutting, and espionage of competitors.
30
 The Court considered 
whether these practices, many considered legal at common law, fell 
within the purview of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Answering in the affirmative, the Court determined that it was the 
intent of Congress to prohibit not only those restraints illegal at 
 
competing. Id. at 279. 
 24. Id. at 282. The ancillary restraints doctrine, penned by Judge Taft, argued that a 
restraint can be upheld only if it has a reasonable justification:  
Before such agreements are upheld . . . the court must find that the restraints attempted 
thereby are reasonably necessary . . . to the enjoyment by the buyer of the property, 
good will, or interest in the partnership bought; . . . to the prevention of possible injury 
to the business of the seller from use by the buyer of the thing sold; or . . . to protection 
from the danger of loss to the employer‘s business caused by the unjust use on the part 
of the [employee] of the confidential knowledge acquired in such business. 
Id. at 281. 
 25. Id. at 283. 
 26. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).  
 27. The Court did, however, reference its Joint Traffic decision in noting that interstate 
commerce ―must not be affected only indirectly or incidentally‖ for the Sherman Act to apply. 
Id. at 228–29; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (applying a ―standard of 
reason‖ to judge Sherman Act claims); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) 
(reaffirming Standard Oil rationale). 
 29. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 30. Id. at 42–43. The government also charged Standard Oil with monopolistic behavior 
that resulted in ―enormous and unreasonable profits.‖ Id. 
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common law, but also the ―many new forms of contracts and 
combinations . . . being evolved from existing economic 
conditions.‖31  
The Court proposed the use of a ―standard of reason,‖ similar to 
that used at common law,
32
 to condemn as unreasonable those 
arrangements resulting in ―undue restraint[s] of interstate or foreign 
commerce.‖33 Justice Harlan, dissenting in part, expressed concern 
that this new standard would bring substantial uncertainty into the 
business community.
34
 Despite this concern, the majority concluded 
that it was the function of the judiciary, not the legislature, to make 
such interpretive decisions.
35
  
Questions still remained, however, about how courts should apply 
the new standard.
36
 It was not until seven years later in Chicago 
Board of Trade v. United States
37
 that the Supreme Court took on the 
 
 31. Id. at 59. 
 32. Id. at 60. Chief Justice White explained: 
[T]he standard of reason which had been applied at the common law and in this 
country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute was intended 
to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether, in a given case, a 
particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute 
provided. 
Id. 
 33. Id. at 59–60. 
 34. Id. at 102–03 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan was 
the only member of the Court to express concern about adopting the standard of reason: 
I have a strong conviction that it will throw the business of the country into confusion 
and invite widely-extended and harassing litigation, the injurious effects of which will 
be felt for many years to come. When Congress prohibited every contract, 
combination, or monopoly, in restraint of commerce, it prescribed a simple, definite 
rule that all could understand, and which could be easily applied by everyone wishing 
to obey the law, and not to conduct their business in violation of law. But now, it is to 
be feared, we are to have, in cases without number, the constantly recurring inquiry-
difficult to solve by proof-whether the particular contract, combination, or trust 
involved in each case is or is not an ‗unreasonable‘ or ‗undue‘ restraint of trade. 
Id.  
 35. See id. at 69–70 (majority opinion); see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH 
NO. 23, THE RULE OF REASON 47 (1999) (―Chief Justice White‘s view in Standard Oil was that 
the Court‘s interpretive task of analyzing the effects of a given practice was a judicial function, 
not a legislative or administrative one.‖). 
 36. See MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES 
OF RULE AND DISCRETION 9 (1957) (noting that with regards to the standard of reason, Justice 
White was ―more concerned with having the rule recognized than in defining its content‖). 
 37. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
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task of providing relevant factors for courts to consider under the 
standard of reason.  
The Chicago Board of Trade case involved a restraint imposed by 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) that prevented grain exchange 
members from purchasing grain below the closing price of each day‘s 
last call session.
38
 The Court noted that because every business 
agreement regulates trade to some degree, ―[t]he true test of legality 
is whether the restraint imposed . . . merely regulates and . . . 
promotes competition or whether it . . . may suppress or even destroy 
competition.‖39  
The Court listed a number of factors that could be considered in 
making this determination, including: (1) the conditions before and 
after the restraint is imposed; (2) the nature of the restraint and its 
effect; (3) the history of the restraint and the harm that is believed to 
cause; and (4) the party‘s reasons or purpose for adopting the 
restraint.
40
 Considering these factors in light of the facts of the case, 
the Court held that CBOT‘s ―call rule‖ restraint served a legitimate 
business purpose that was ultimately procompetitive both in purpose 
and in effect.
41
  
Although the Chicago Board of Trade Court never specifically 
used the term, Justice Brandeis‘s list of relevant factors later became 
―[o]ne of the most frequently cited statements‖ in support of the ―rule 
of reason.‖42 The Court‘s desire to bring more clarity, however, 
ultimately had the opposite effect as the analysis contained little 
guidance or structure.
43
 Chicago Board of Trade‘s use of general 
 
 38. Id. at 235–38. This practice was known as the ―call rule.‖ Id. at 237. 
 39. Id. at 238. CBOT contended that the call rule was not an attempt to set prices, but 
rather an attempt to prevent the unfair practice of agents selling cheaper grain to buyers after 
hours. Id. at 240. 
 40. Id. at 238. Justice Brandeis‘s reasonableness analysis is commonly invoked by 
modern proponents of the rule of reason. 
 41. Id. at 239–41. To arrive at this decision, the Court focused on the nature, scope and 
effect of the call rule. Id. The Court held that the nature of the rule was generally designed to 
shorten work days, the scope of the restraint applied only to a small number of exchange 
members and ―only to a small part of the grain shipped from day to day‖ and the restraint had 
several procompetitive purposes in effect. Id. 
 42. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977). 
 43. See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role 
for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 347 (2000) (―Brandeis combined elements of 
all three common law tests to justify the Board‘s call rule.‖); Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule 
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language and apparent departure from common law is widely-
attributed as the source for many complexities found in the modern 
rule of reason analysis.
44
 
B. The Rise of Per Se Illegality 
In response to complexities that arose in applying the standard of 
reason, courts also began using a bright-line ―per se‖ rule to 
summarily condemn clearly anticompetitive practices.
45
 The Supreme 
Court‘s first application of the per se rule arose in the context of a 
vertical restraint, or an ―attempt by a manufacturer to control the 
activities of wholesalers, distributors, or retailers.‖46 
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
47
 the Court 
held that it was unlawful for a manufacturer to set the minimum 
prices at which an independent reseller can resell its products.
48
 The 
 
of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1398 (2009) (―Under Chief 
Justice White‘s logic in Standard Oil, Congress implicitly endorsed the common law‘s rule of 
reason in enacting the Sherman Act. . . . [However,] CBOT‘s open-ended rule of reason 
significantly differed from its common law counterpart. CBOT‘s rule of reason neither 
identified categories of conduct that were presumptively anticompetitive or socially undesirable 
nor contained any other presumption of illegality.‖). 
 44. The fact that Chicago Board of Trade failed to identify which party has the burden of 
proof or how much weight should be given to each factor has been heavily criticized by 
commentators. See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The 
Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of Trade 
Analysis, 15 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1992) (―[O]pen-ended listing of possibly relevant factors is 
hardly illuminating as to their analytic inter-relationship, nor does it inform a decision maker of 
what weights to ascribe to different factual conclusions.‖); Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the 
Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263, 303–04 (1986) 
(discussing the failure of Brandeis to indicate the relative significance of any particular factor); 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 252 (2d ed. 1999) (―Justice Brandeis‘ statement of the rule of reason . . . has been 
one of the most damaging in . . . antitrust‖ as it ―has suggested to many courts that . . . nearly 
everything is relevant.‖). 
 45. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (―[T]here are certain 
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any 
redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without 
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.‖). 
 46. Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Justice and the Evolution of the Common Law, 3 J.L. ECON. & 
POL‘Y 81, 99 (2006). 
 47. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 48. Id. at 408–09. Dr. Miles Medical Company manufactured and sold proprietary 
medicines, prepared by means of ―secret methods and formulas‖ to retail druggists. Id. at 374. 
The company entered into consignment agreements prohibiting the consignee from selling to 
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Court noted that the price-fixing arrangement imposed by the 
manufacturer, known as minimum RPM, was unlawful under section 
1 of the Sherman Act because its purpose was to ―prevent 
competition among those who trade.‖49 For the next ninety-six 
years,
50
 the 1911 Dr. Miles decision was construed by courts as a per 
se ban on all types of vertical RPM.
51
  
Sixteen years later in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
52
 the 
Court extended the per se rationale to horizontal price-fixing 
arrangements among competitors.
53
 Although the per se rule did not 
become the prevailing standard in Sherman Act adjudication until the 
1940s, some commentators believe that its rapid expansion was a 
direct result of the complexities found in Chicago Board of Trade.
54
 
 
anyone but designated retailers and wholesalers, as well as agency agreements with retail 
druggists prohibiting them from selling their products below a set price. Id. Dr. Miles 
subsequently sued John D. Parks & Co., a drug wholesaler that refused to enter into a 
consignment agreement but acquired Dr. Miles‘ medicines from others in Dr. Miles‘ 
distribution chain with the intent to reduce prices. Id. at 381–82. The Court held that because 
Dr. Miles‘ contracts restrained trade, they were ―injurious to the public‖ and should thus be 
voided. Id. at 408. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Dr. Miles was overturned by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 51. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881 (―In Dr. Miles . . . the Court established the rule that it is 
per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act . . . for a manufacturer to agree with its distributor 
to set the minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufacturer‘s goods.‖). 
 52. 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Trenton Potteries involved a price-fixing agreement between 
twenty-three suppliers of pottery fixtures. Id. at 393–94. Shunning Chicago Board of Trade, the 
trial court submitted the case to a jury upon the instruction that if it found the agreements at 
issue to have occurred, it should return a guilty verdict. Id. at 395. In affirming the defendants‘ 
convictions under the Sherman Act, the Court limited Chicago Board of Trade to its facts 
noting that the decision dealt ―with a regulation of a board of trade, [and] does not sanction a 
price agreement among competitors in an open market.‖ Id. at 401. 
 53. Id. at 406–07. Horizontal price-fixing occurs when two or more parties at the same 
level of market structure agree on prices they will charge customers. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, 
ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK 134 (1995). Courts are especially wary of these types of 
arrangements. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (noting 
that horizontal restraints frequently are ―naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling 
of competition‖). 
 54. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 7 (1978). The Court did, 
however, apply a Chicago Board of Trade analysis in one Depression-era case. See 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) (using a rule of reason analysis 
to approve restraints employed by a cartel of coal producers designed to stabilize prices through 
the use of an exclusive selling agency). The Appalachian Coals decision is generally 
understood to be an aberration, however, brought about by the Great Depression. See PHILLIP 
AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 190 (5th ed. 1997) (―Appalachian Coals is 
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The 1940 Supreme Court decision United States v. Socony 
Vacuum Oil Co.
55
 expanded the per se rule to include horizontal 
arrangements that directly affect prices without necessarily fixing 
them.
56
 The Socony Court rejected many of the popular justifications 
for price-fixing,
57
 forcefully declaring that, ―[u]nder the Sherman Act 
a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, 
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in 
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.‖58 
Over the next two decades, the per se rule was expanded to 
condemn tying arrangements (arrangements whereby a party agrees 
to sell a product on the condition that the buyer also purchases a 
different product),
59
 horizontal customer and territorial allocations 
(agreements among competitors to solicit customers only within a 
certain geographic area),
60
 vertical non-price restraints (restrictions 
imposed on dealers with regards to matters other than price such as 
territorial exclusions or customer allocation),
61
 group boycotts 
(concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders),
62
 and 
maximum RPM (capping the price distributors can charge for 
goods).
63
 The underlying rationale for the rapid expansion of the per 
 
often regarded today as an aberration of the 1930s, when competition was often 
deemphasized.‖); RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 126 (2d ed. 
1981) (explaining that the outcome in Appalachian Coals was because faith in policy of 
competition during the Depression era was ―deeply shaken‖). 
 55. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 56. Id. at 228. Invoking Trenton Potteries, the Socony Court condemned a joint program 
among major oil companies to maintain gasoline prices at an artificially high level. Id.  
 57. The Court listed ―[r]uinous competition,‖ ―financial disaster,‖ and ―evils of price 
cutting‖ as all ―ostensible justifications for price-fixing.‖ Id. at 221.  
 58. Id. at 223. Although Socony was one of the many smaller companies that the Standard 
Oil Company was split into following the Court‘s decision in Standard Oil, the Court opted not 
to apply the standard of reason. For further discussion on this topic, see Daniel A. Crane, The 
Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust in the Two New Deals, in 
ANTITRUST STORIES 91–119 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007). 
 59. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 60. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); United States v. Topco Assocs., 
405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 61. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (―Under the 
Sherman Act, it is unreasonable . . . to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an 
article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.‖). 
 62. See Klor‘s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959). 
 63. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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se rule was perhaps best described by Justice Black in Northern 
Pacific Railway. Co. v. United States
64
:  
 This principle of per se unreasonableness . . . avoids the 
necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged 
economic investigation into the entire history of the industry 
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine 
at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—
an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
65
 
This language embodies the general feeling that courts at the time 
were unwilling to spend judicial time and resources analyzing the 
effects of different restraints on the market. 
C. Emergence of the Rule of Reason 
Despite its dominance in Sherman Act adjudication for nearly 
thirty years, by the mid-1960s the per se rule came under heavy 
criticism from businesses and legal commentators alike.
66
 Although 
the per se rule promoted consistent application and judicial 
efficiency, the rule was chastised by economists concerned with 
―false positives,‖ or courts condemning practices that in reality had 
few anticompetitive effects.
67
 Mindful of these concerns, the 
Supreme Court in a series of three 1970s court decisions reinstated 
the newly-coined ―rule of reason‖ as the dominant form of antitrust 
adjudication.  
 
 64. 356 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 65. Id. at 5. 
 66. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division (II), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the 
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential 
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283–88 (1975). Much of the criticism came 
from proponents of the burgeoning Chicago School Efficiency Model. The Chicago School 
assumes that the sole goal of antitrust enforcement should be economic efficiency and that 
manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is 
consistent with the efficient distribution of their products.  
 67. See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role 
for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 350–51 (2000) (noting that while the 
Department of Justice was effective in prosecuting cartels, application of the per se rules in the 
private sector produced an ―intolerable level of false positives‖). 
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In Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania,
68
 the Court expressly 
overruled a ten-year-old precedent in holding that vertical non-price 
restraints should be judged under the rule of reason.
69
 The Court 
acknowledged that there is ―substantial scholarly and judicial 
authority‖ supporting the procompetitive benefits of non-price 
restraints and that ―departure from the rule-of-reason standard must 
be based upon demonstrable economic effect . . . rather than . . . 
formalistic line drawing.‖70  
The following year in National Society of Professional Engineers 
v. United States,
71
 the Court considered whether an engineering 
society‘s ethical canon banning competitive bidding for services 
should be condemned as an unlawful price-fixing arrangement.
72
 
While under a traditional per se analysis the horizontal restriction 
would have been invalid on its face, the Court opted to apply a rule of 
reason to examine the restraint.
73
 Although the Court condemned the 
restriction, National Society demonstrated the Court‘s willingness to 
consider economic justifications for even obvious price-fixing 
arrangements.
74
  
In the 1979 case Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc.
75
 (―BMI‖), the Court went one step further and upheld a 
price-fixing agreement among potential competitors because of the 
restraint‘s practical effects.76 In BMI, thousands of authors and 
composers joined together with publishing agencies to issue blanket 
 
 68. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The question posed to the Court was whether Sylvania violated 
section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into and enforcing franchise agreements that 
prohibited the sale of Sylvania products other than from specified locations. Id. at 40. 
 69. Id. at 60. The Court overruled United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967). The Sylvania Court noted, ―Although Schwinn is supported by the principle of stare 
decisis . . . we are convinced that the need for clarification of the law in this area justifies 
reconsideration.‖ Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 47 (citation omitted). 
 70. Id. at 58–59. The Sylvania Court went as far as to assert that ―[s]ince the early years of 
this century a judicial gloss on this statutory language has established the ‗rule of reason‘ as the 
prevailing standard of analysis.‖ Id. at 49. 
 71. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 72. Id. at 683–84. 
 73. Id. at 688–89.  
 74. Id. at 693–95. The Court disagreed with the Society‘s argument that the restraint was 
justified because bidding on engineering services would lead to lower quality of work, thus 
risking the health and safety of the public. Id.  
 75. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 76. Id. at 20. 
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licenses for the use of all of their musical compositions.
77
 Using a 
threshold inquiry to determine which standard to apply,
78
 the Court 
invoked Addyston Pipe’s ancillary restraints doctrine to ultimately 
approve of the arrangement under the rule of reason.
79
 The Court 
concluded that the blanket license was not a naked restraint of trade 
with no purpose except stifling of competition, but rather a useful 
tool for the ―integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against 
unauthorized copyright use.‖80  
Despite a dramatic increase in the use of the rule of reason, courts 
still struggled on occasion to determine when borderline restraints 
warranted a per se analysis. As a result, some courts began applying a 
truncated rule of reason analysis that gave the restraint a ―quick look‖ 
before its condemnation.
81
  
In the 1984 case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma,
82
 for example, the Court considered whether the NCAA‘s 
imposition of price and output restraints on television contracts for 
college football teams should be considered per se unlawful.
83
 
Despite the television plan‘s apparent restraint on trade,84 the Court 
opted to take a ―quick look‖ at the procompetitive justifications for 
the plan without first requiring the plaintiff prove the NCAA‘s 
market share.
85
 Although the ―quick look‖ test was applied by courts 
 
 77. Id. at 5–7. BMI was an association that represented approximately 20,000 music 
copyright owners and provided licenses to licensees who wanted to play the copyright owners‘ 
works. Id. at 5. BMI would receive fees directly from the licensees, and then distribute the fees 
to the copyright owners. Id. at 8–9. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) challenged the 
association as a clear price-fixing arrangement: composers and publishing houses joining 
together to set prices. Id. at 8. The Court upheld the blanket license because of its practical 
justification in the marketplace. Id. at 20. 
 78. Id. at 19–20. In deciding which test to apply, the BMI Court noted, ―[I]n 
characterizing this conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must focus on whether the effect 
and . . . purpose of the practice . . . facially appears to be one that would always or almost 
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.‖ Id. 
 79. Id. at 20–21. 
 80. Id. at 20. 
 81. See infra notes 82–87 and accompanying text. 
 82. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).  
 83. Id. at 89–91.  
 84. Id. at 106–07. The Court recognized that by its very nature the television plan reduced 
output, raised price and created a price structure ―unresponsive to consumer preference.‖ Id. at 
106–07. 
 85. The Court noted, ―[W]hen there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or 
output, ‗no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character 
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and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on several more 
occasions,
86
 it eventually fell out of favor after the Supreme Court 
failed to definitively define its scope.
87
  
Throughout the 1980s, the Court continued to use efficiency 
justifications to extend rule of reason examination to both horizontal 
and vertical arrangements.
88
 The Court refused, however, to eliminate 
the per se rule altogether,
89
 especially with regards to RPM.
90
 Despite 
inconsistent and varying applications throughout jurisdictions, the 
rule of reason continued to maintain popularity over the next twenty 
years.
91
 
D. The Leegin Decision 
On December 7, 2006, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine whether Dr. Miles, the longstanding pillar of the per se 
rule, should be overturned in favor of applying the rule of reason to 
 
of such an agreement.‘‖ Id. at 109 (quoting Nat‘l Soc‘y of Prof‘l Eng‘rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). 
 86. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed‘n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (applying ―quick look‖ 
to an agreement among dentists to hold x-rays from insurance companies); In re Mass. Bd. of 
Registration on Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 605 (1988) (―Restraints on truthful advertising for 
professional services are inherently likely to produce anticompetitive effects.‖). 
 87. See Cal. Dental Ass‘n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999) (holding that courts may 
choose when to apply quick-look based on their own assessment of the restraint).  
 88. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. 85; Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 
(1988) (applying the rule of reason to a vertical agreement that had the purpose and effect of 
increasing retail prices, but without specifying the price to be charged). On other occasions, the 
Court modified existing per se rules. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2 (1984) (modifying the per se rule for tying arrangements to make the plaintiff show 
defendant possessed significant market share). 
 89. In fact, the term after BMI was decided, the Court considered two similar horizontal 
cases without even referencing the threshold analysis used in BMI. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target 
Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam) (finding that beer wholesalers who agreed to stop 
extending credit to beer retailers was a per se violation of Section 1); Arizona v. Maricopa 
Cnty. Med. Soc‘y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (disregarding procompetitive justifications of 
agreement among physicians to set the maximum fees under certain insurance plans in finding 
arrangement per se unlawful). 
 90. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass‘n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980) 
(reaffirming per se rule for RPM); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 
(1984) (declining to apply the rule of reason to RPM despite asserting that vertical price and 
nonprice restraints are indistinguishable). 
 91. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling Albrecht and holding 
that maximum RPM should be examined under the rule of reason). 
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judge minimum RPM (also referred to as vertical price-fixing).
92
 The 
case, Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
93
 
involved a manufacturer of high-end women‘s accessories that 
suspended shipments to a profitable retailer for discounting its 
products below a suggested retail price.
94
 In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
held that the procompetitive justifications for RPM were sufficient to 
overturn ninety-six years of precedent and examine RPM agreements 
under the rule of reason.
95
  
To support this conclusion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, attacked the rationale used by the Dr. Miles Court.
96
 The 
majority next referenced the vast number of commentators arguing 
that the benefits of vertical RPM are similar to those of other vertical 
restraints.
97
 Relying on this rationale, Justice Kennedy recited many 
of the same justifications used by the Sylvania Court in applying the 
rule of reason to non-price restraints.
98
 Specifically, the Court 
contended that vertical RPM alleviates the ―free-rider‖ problem by 
 
 92. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881 (2007). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 884. Leegin Creative Leather Products was a designer, manufacturer, and 
distributer of leather goods and accessories under the brand name ―Brighton.‖ Leegin adopted a 
policy that it would do business only with retailers that followed its suggested retail prices. Id. 
at 882–83. When Leegin discovered that PSKS, Inc. (operator of a women‘s apparel store 
named Kay‘s Kloset) was discounting its products, it suspended product shipments to PSKS, 
ultimately putting the store out of business. Id. at 884. PSKS then filed suit, alleging that 
Leegin‘s pricing policy was unlawful RPM. At trial, Leegin admitted that it had entered into 
price-fixing agreements with its retailers, but sought to introduce expert testimony that the 
policy was ultimately procompetitive. Id. Relying on Dr. Miles, the District Court refused to 
admit the proffered evidence and the jury found awarded PSKS $3.6 million in damages. The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the ruling. Id. at 884–85. 
 95. Id. at 900.  
 96. Id. at 888–89. Justice Kennedy argued that the Dr. Miles Court never considered the 
procompetitive effects of vertical RPM, erroneously relied on a treatise published in 1628, and 
wrongfully analogized vertical RPM with horizontal agreements. Id. at 888. 
 97. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 184–91 (2005); BORK, supra note 54, at 288–91. The Court also relied heavily on 
the Amicus Briefs submitted on behalf of Leegin. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 889–90. 
 98. At least one commentator has argued that the Sylvania “maxims‖ have been 
incorrectly offered as immutable proof that vertical RPM is procompetitive. See Warren S. 
Grimes, The Path Forward after Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of the Antitrust Law of 
Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467 (2008). 
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preventing ―the discounter from undercutting the service provider,‖99 
encourages retailer services that would not otherwise be provided,
100
 
and increases interbrand competition by facilitating market entry for 
new firms and brands.
101
  
The Court rejected PSKS‘s primary arguments that the per se rule 
should be affirmed for ―administrative convenience,‖102 that vertical 
RPM inherently leads to higher consumer prices,
103
 and that stare 
decisis required the upholding of Dr. Miles.
104
 The majority 
 
 99. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891. An example of ―free-riding‖ was given in the Brief for 
Economists:  
A customer may take advantage of one retailer‘s informed sales staff, hands-on 
demonstrations, and convenient shopping locations and hours. Having received the 
value of those services, the customer may then purchase the product from another 
retailer that does not provide the same level of service and, therefore, can afford to sell 
the product for less.  
Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioner at 7, Leegin Creative Leather Prods, 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173681; see also Lester G. 
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960) (describing 
phenomenon of free-riding); G. Franklin Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Incentives for 
Resale Price Maintenance Under Imperfect Information, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 337 (1983) 
(providing a description of the free-riding problem). But see Grimes, supra note 98 (offering 
support that no free-riding took place in Leegin). 
 100. The Court explained, ―Offering the retailer a guaranteed margin and threatening 
termination if it does not live up to expectations may be the most efficient way to expand the 
manufacturer‘s market share by inducing the retailer‘s performance and allowing it to use its 
own initiative and experience in providing valuable services.‖ Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892. 
 101. Id. at 891. The Court noted that ―[n]ew manufacturers and manufacturers entering new 
markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make 
the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products 
unknown to the consumer.‖ Id. (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 55 (1977)). 
 102. PSKS argued that a bright-line per se rule allows manufacturers and distributors to 
efficiently conduct business by knowing what is permissible: ―[D]espite the theoretical 
possibility of finding instances in which horizontal price fixing, or vertical price fixing, are 
economically justified, the courts have held them unlawful per se, concluding that the 
administrative virtues of simplicity outweigh the occasional ‗economic‘ loss.‖ Brief of 
Respondent at 28, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 
06-480), 2007 WL 621855. 
 103. See id. at 6 (―The only uniform and demonstrable effect of RPM is higher consumer 
prices.‖). This argument was rejected by the Court, which stated that ―[r]espondent is mistaken 
in relying on pricing effects absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct.‖ Leegin, 551 
U.S. at 895. 
 104. Id. at 899–903. Justice Kennedy argued that stare decisis is not as ―significant‖ in 
Sherman Act cases. Id. at 899. He noted that because the Sherman Act is treated as a common-
law statute, its ―prohibition on ‗restraint[s] of trade‘ evolve[s] to meet the dynamics of present 
economic conditions.‖ Id. 
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acknowledged, however, that RPM can have anticompetitive effects 
―depending upon the circumstances in which . . . [it is] formed.‖105 To 
ensure that manufacturers will not use RPM solely as a means of 
increasing profit margin, Justice Kennedy recommended that lower 
courts use rules and presumptions to design a new litigation structure 
that separates good RPM from bad: 
 As courts gain experience considering the effects of these 
restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of 
decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure 
the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from 
the market and to provide more guidance to businesses. Courts 
can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or 
even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a 
fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and 
to promote procompetitive ones.
106
 
 Justice Kennedy also provided courts several factors that could be 
relevant to the inquiry. Specifically, Justice Kennedy noted that 
courts may consider the number of competitors in the market that 
have adopted RPM agreements,
107
 whether the RPM originated with 
the manufacturer or the retailer,
108
 and whether the manufacturer or 
retailer party to the RPM agreement possesses market power.
109
 
 
 105. Id. at 894. Among the Court‘s chief concerns was the formation of cartels on both the 
manufacturer and the retail level, as well as problems RPM agreements can create when 
retailers with considerable market power use RPM to incentivize retailers not to sell the 
products of smaller rivals or new entrants. Id. at 892–94. 
 106. Id. at 898–99. 
 107. The Court noted that the possibility RPM agreements are facilitating cartels is less 
likely when few competitors employ such agreements, but ―[r]esale price maintenance should 
be subject to more careful scrutiny . . . if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice.‖ Id. 
at 897. 
 108. The Court explained: ―If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical 
price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or 
supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.‖ Id. at 898–99.  
 109. The Court stated that ―[i]f a retailer lacks market power, manufacturers likely can sell 
their goods through rival retailers . . . [a]nd if a manufacturer lacks market power, there is less 
likelihood it can use the practice to keep competitors away from distribution outlets.‖ Id. at 898. 
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In his dissent, Justice Breyer questioned the ability of judges and 
juries to make these types of complex inquiries.
110
 With regards to 
market power, for example, Justice Breyer noted that ―[t]he Court‘s 
invitation to consider the existence of ‗market power,‘ . . . invites 
lengthy time-consuming argument among competing experts, as they 
seek to apply abstract, highly technical, criteria to often ill-defined 
markets.‖111 Justice Breyer‘s dissent embodied many of the concerns 
commentators have had with the traditional, unstructured rule of 
reason since its inception in Chicago Board of Trade.
112
 
II. ANALYSIS 
The inherent problems found in the traditional rule of reason have 
necessitated the need for a new litigation structure to examine 
RPM.
113
 Although the Leegin Court did not specifically endorse a 
new analytical framework, the majority certainly did not advocate for 
the rule of reason as it has been applied in the past. The burden-
shifting framework used under the traditional, unstructured rule of 
reason highlights some of the standard‘s inherent flaws.114  
 
 110. Id. at 916 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted:  
How easily can courts identify instances in which the benefits are likely to outweigh 
potential harms? My own answer is, not very easily. For one thing, it is often difficult 
to identify who—producer or dealer—is the moving force behind any given resale 
price maintenance agreement. . . . For another thing . . . it is difficult to determine just 
when, and where, the ―free riding‖ problem is serious enough to warrant legal 
protection. 
Id.  
 111. Id. at 917. 
 112. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: 
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) (noting that content of 
rule of reason is largely unknown and the Sylvania Court ―was deceived if it thought it was 
subjecting those restrictions to scrutiny under a well-understood legal standard‖). 
 113. Most of the burdens in a rule of reason analysis weigh heavily against the plaintiff. 
See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009). For example, the Eleventh Circuit requires a plaintiff to 
show not only the defendant‘s anticompetitive effect, but also that ―the defendant‘s conduct has 
no pro-competitive benefit or justification.‖ Spanish Broad. Sys. v. Clear Channel Commc‘ns, 
Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1071 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 
72 F.3d 1538, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 114. While applications of the traditional rule of reason may differ slightly from circuit to 
circuit, all federal courts employ some type of burden-shifting framework. See Carrier, supra 
note 113, at 834–36. 
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Under a traditional rule of reason analysis, the plaintiff typically 
bears the initial burden of establishing that the conduct complained of 
―produces significant anticompetitive effects within the relevant 
product and geographic markets.‖115 For antitrust plaintiffs, this is no 
simple feat. Establishing market share is a complex undertaking that 
typically comes at considerable time, effort and expense.
116
 In fact, a 
showing of anticompetitive effects generally requires the ―nearly 
impossible‖ task of proving that the price and supply of goods on the 
market is different from the levels that would be offered in a 
competitive market.
117
  
If the plaintiff is somehow able to satisfy this burden, the burden 
then shifts back to the defendant to provide a procompetitive 
justification for the challenged restraint.
118
 The obvious concern here 
is that an antitrust defendant will almost always be able to point to 
some procompetitive justification for imposing a restraint.
119
 
Preventing the phenomenon of free-riding, for example, can always 
be asserted by the defendant despite its difficulty to objectively 
measure.
120
 
 
 115. Nat‘l Hockey League Players‘ Ass‘n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 
712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 116. See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817, 825 
(1987) (noting that the ―measurement of market power, which requires the definition of relevant 
product and geographic markets, is the most elusive and unreliable aspect of antitrust 
enforcement‖); MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 210 
(4th ed. 1997) (―In theory and practice, relevant market definition is as difficult an undertaking 
as any in antitrust.‖). 
 117. Peter Nealis, Per Se Legality: A New Standard in Antitrust Adjudication Under the 
Rule of Reason, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 367–68 (2000). Attorney Peter Nealis notes, ―[D]ue to lag 
effects and difficulties in establishing competitive levels in the first place, this situation is 
nearly impossible to establish.‖ Id.; see also Grimes, supra note 98, at 487 (noting that the 
proving anticompetitive effects can be burdensome because ―plaintiff will have to present 
evidence not only of the defendant‘s use of the restraint, but also of use of the restraint by rival 
suppliers‖). 
 118. See Care Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 427 F.3d 1008, 1013 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
 119. One study performed showed that from 1977 to 1999, only 3 percent of rule of reason 
cases were invalidated because the defendant failed to demonstrate a legitimate procompetitive 
justification. See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 
BYU L. REV. 1265, 1268. 
 120. See FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 551–55 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing the ―severe limitations‖ of the 
free-rider justification for RPM).  
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If and when the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff may 
respond by showing that the restraint‘s legitimate procompetitive 
objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner, 
or that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the 
procompetitive objectives.
121
 Again, this gives courts the unenviable 
task of trying to weigh seemingly independent economic factors 
against each other in some sort of meaningful way.
122
 Only after the 
plaintiff satisfies this final burden will the factfinder actually balance 
both sides and ―engage in a careful weighing of the competitive 
effects of the agreement.‖123 
Rarely does antitrust litigation employing a rule of reason analysis 
ever make it to the balancing stage,
124
 and if it does, it has assuredly 
come at considerable time and expense to the plaintiff.
125
 Because 
―litigation under the rule of reason generally is extraordinarily 
expensive in relation to the size of the interests at stake,‖ the 
traditional rule of reason deters even meritorious claims from being 
brought in the first instance.
126
 
 
 121. Nat‘l Hockey League Players‘ Ass‘n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 
712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 122. On at least one occasion, the Court admitted its own limitations in this regard. See 
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610–11 (1972) (noting that the ability ―to 
determine the respective values of competition in various sectors of the economy‖ was beyond 
the Court‘s competency and authority under the Sherman Act); see also Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (―One 
cannot fairly expect judges and juries in such cases to apply complex economic criteria without 
making a considerable number of mistakes.‖). 
 123. Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 507 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 124. See William J. Kolasky, Jr., Reinvigorating Antitrust Enforcement in the United 
States: A Proposal, 22 ANTITRUST 85, 87 (2008) (noting that it ―is now conventional wisdom 
for antitrust lawyers to observe that courts . . . almost never explicitly balance the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an alleged restraint‖). 
 125. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 97, at 105 (2005) (litigating a rule of reason case is ―one 
of the most costly procedures in antitrust practice‖); Mark Crane, The Future Direction of 
Antitrust, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 16–17 (―The rule of reason requires documents from third 
parties, expert testimony, and statistical data as well. The result is not only a longer trial but 
substantially increased discovery and pretrial expense.‖). Not only are antitrust trials 
enormously expensive, but they can also be exceedingly time-consuming. See, e.g., United 
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 367 (1967) (noting that trial took seventy days 
to litigate in district court). 
 126. 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1620.1, at 317 (Supp. 2009). As a result, 
―many instances of anticompetitive RPM may go unchallenged.‖ Id. 
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Unsurprisingly, traditional application of the rule of reason has 
caused courts and antitrust plaintiffs a number of problems. The most 
glaring deficiency is that under the rule of reason, plaintiffs almost 
always lose.
127
 One study recognized that from 1999 to 2009, 
defendants won cases adjudicated using a rule of reason analysis 99.5 
percent of the time.
128
 A staggering 97 percent of the cases were 
disposed of at the pleading stage on the grounds that the plaintiff 
could not satisfy its initial burden of showing an anticompetitive 
effect.
129
 Only 2 percent ever reached a stage where the 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the restraint were 
balanced.
130
 
There are obvious concerns if courts continue to apply the 
traditional, unstructured rule of reason to minimum RPM post-
Leegin. Minimum RPM is known to raise consumer prices,
131
 and 
 
 127. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule 
of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 70–71 (1991) (observing that defendants prevail in over 90 
percent of nonprice vertical restraint cases studied); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 126, 
¶ 1620.1, at 317 (―Since the Sylvania decision in 1977, very few private plaintiffs have 
successfully challenged vertical nonprice restraints.‖); Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating 
Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 305 (1987) (declaring that adjudication 
under the rule of reason ―as a practical matter meant that they were declared lawful per se‖); 
Posner, supra note 112, at 14 (noting that the rule of reason in practice ―is little more than a 
euphemism for nonliability‖).  
 128. See Carrier, supra note 113, at 828. Carrier‘s updated survey was based on a Westlaw 
search of all federal cases decided between February 2, 1999 and May 5, 2009. Id. Out of the 
222 cases that were retrieved, the defendant won in 221 of them. Id. at 830. 
 129. Id. at 828. Carrier concluded from his study that first, ―plaintiffs almost never win 
under the rule of reason,‖ and second, ―courts decide almost all rule of reason cases by finding 
that the plaintiff failed to show an anticompetitive effect.‖ Id. at 830. Carrier noted four patterns 
that emerged when examining 215 cases in which courts disposed of the case on the ground that 
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an anticompetitive effect: First, courts in 110 cases concluded 
that the plaintiff did not show an anticompetitive effect without addressing market power. Id. In 
66 cases, courts found a lack of market power without discussing anticompetitive effects. Id. In 
32 cases, courts asserted that there was no anticompetitive effect and no market power. Id. 
Finally, in 7 cases courts found a lack of anticompetitive effect and a legitimate procompetitive 
justification for the conduct. Id. 
 130. Id. at 827. Only 5 cases out of 222 reached the balancing stage. Id. at 831. Out of 
those 5 cases, only one time was a plaintiff victorious. Id.; United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 
344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 131. Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Leegin, ―The only safe predictions to make about 
today‘s decision are that it will likely raise the price of goods at retail and that it will create 
considerable legal turbulence as lower courts seek to develop workable principles.‖ Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 929 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 126, ¶ 1604b, at 40 (―[R]esale price maintenance tends 
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under the traditional rule of reason, even anticompetitive 
arrangements will likely result in de facto per se legality.
132
  
Although a number of structured solutions have been proposed 
since Leegin,
133
 this Note will focus on the two tests that are most 
likely to: (1) comport with the Leegin Court‘s vision for a new rule of 
reason; (2) correct the structural defects found in the traditional rule 
of reason; and (3) garner enough support to influence future judicial 
applications of the rule of reason to minimum RPM.  
III. POST-LEEGIN PROPOSALS 
The first test that has gained momentum post-Leegin is an 
offshoot of the quick look analysis that treats certain restraints as 
―inherently suspect.‖ Borrowing from the quick look cases of the 
1980s,
134
 this analytical framework was revisited by the FTC pre-
Leegin in the 2002 case In re Polygram Holding, Inc.
135
 In PolyGram 
Holding, the FTC filed suit against several music distributors for 
allegedly restricting price competition by imposing an ―advertising 
moratorium‖ on particular albums.136 Opting to use a truncated rule 
of reason, the FTC noted in its final order that ―[a] plaintiff may 
avoid full rule of reason analysis, including the pleading and proof of 
market power, if it demonstrates that the conduct at issue is 
inherently suspect owing to its likely tendency to suppress 
competition.‖137  
 
to produce higher consumer prices than would otherwise be the case. The evidence is 
persuasive on this point.‖). 
 132. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 127.  
 133. For a great discussion on the various tests that have arisen since Leegin, see Thomas 
A. Lambert, Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for Evaluating 
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937 (2009). 
 134. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); FTC v. Ind. 
Fed‘n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); In re Mass. Bd. of Registration on Optometry, 110 
F.T.C. 549, 605 (1988). 
 135. In re PolyGram Holding, Inc., No. 9298, 2002 WL 1422222 (F.T.C. June 20, 2002). 
 136. Id. at 987. Although the case was brought under Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, it is well-established that such cases are to be treated identically to Section 1 
Sherman Act cases. See PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(―[T]he analysis under § 5 of the FTC Act is the same in this case as it would be under § 1 of 
the Sherman Act . . . .‖). 
 137. In re Polygram Holding, 2003 WL 21770765. As explained by the FTC, ―[s]uch 
conduct ordinarily encompasses behavior that past judicial experience and current economic 
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The FTC explained the framework as follows: if the plaintiff 
makes the initial showing that a restraint is likely to suppress 
competition, then the restraint is summarily condemned unless the 
defendant comes forward with some plausible and legally cognizable 
competitive justification for the restraint.
138
 If the defendant 
successfully advances a competitive justification, the plaintiff, 
without necessarily inducing a full market analysis, must make a 
more detailed showing that the restraints at issue are indeed likely to 
harm competition.
139
 The defendant may then introduce evidence that 
either refutes the plaintiff‘s arguments or supports its proffered 
justification. At this point, the factfinder must ascertain whether it 
can draw ―a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a 
restriction.‖140 
Applying this framework to the facts in PolyGram Holding, the 
FTC found that the advertising moratorium was ―presumptively 
anticompetitive‖ and that the defendants‘ proffered justifications 
were ―not cognizable as a matter of law.‖141 The music distributors 
subsequently appealed the FTC‘s order to the D.C. Circuit arguing 
that the FTC failed to apply the proper analytical framework in 
analyzing the restraint.
142
 The D.C. Circuit upheld the order, 
however, noting that, ―[i]f, based upon economic learning and the 
experience of the market, it is obvious that a restraint of trade likely 
impairs competition, then the restraint is presumed unlawful . . . .‖143 
 
learning have shown to warrant summary condemnation.‖ Id. 
 138. Id. The FTC stated that justifications for the restraint ―may consist of plausible 
reasons why practices that are competitively suspect as a general matter may not be expected to 
have adverse consequences in the context of the particular market in question; or they may 
consist of reasons why the practices are likely to have beneficial effects for consumers.‖ Id. 
 139. Id. at 19. Depending on the type of restraint and circumstances of the case, a showing 
must at a minimum entail ―the identification of the theoretical basis for the alleged 
anticompetitive effects and a showing that the effects are indeed likely to be anticompetitive.‖ 
Id. 
 140. Id. at 17.  
 141. Id. at 26–28. 
 142. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 143. Id. at 36. To overcome the presumption, ―the defendant must either identify some 
reason the restraint is unlikely to harm consumers or identify some competitive benefit that 
plausibly offsets the apparent or anticipated harm.‖ Id. 
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A. Treating RPM as Inherently Suspect 
After Leegin was handed down, several influential entities, 
including the American Antitrust Institute and the majority of the 
states‘ attorneys general, advocated that RPM be treated as inherently 
suspect under the PolyGram Holdings framework.
144
 Following the 
Leegin decision in October of 2007, women‘s shoe seller Nine West 
Group Inc. petitioned the FTC to modify a Consent Order entered 
into in 2009, in which the company agreed to no longer undertake 
agreements setting minimum RPM with its retailers.
145
 On behalf of 
twenty-seven states, the Attorney General of New York submitted 
comments urging the denial of Nine West‘s petition.146  
The states argued that if consumers pay more because of vertical 
price-fixing, the restraint should be deemed ―inherently suspect.‖147 
Therefore, under the PolyGram Holdings framework, Nine West had 
the burden of providing a plausible and cognizable justification for 
the restraint.
148
 According to the states, this meant that Nine West 
was required to show: ―(1) its vertical price-fixing caused retailers to 
provide actual enhanced value or services; (2) the enhanced value or 
services increased demand for its shoes; and (3) the increased 
demand from that value or those services was greater than the 
decreased demand caused by the higher prices that consumers 
paid.‖149 If such a showing is made, the plaintiff has an opportunity to 
establish that a less restrictive alternative could have been used to 
 
 144. See Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellant and Reversal, PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (No. 09-40506), 2009 WL 6479731; Amended States‘ Comments Urging Denial of 
Nine West‘s Petition, In re Nine West Group, Inc., No. C-3937 (F.T.C. Apr. 11, 2000) 
[hereinafter States‘ Comments], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ninewestgrp/ 
080117statesamendedcomments.pdf.  
 145. See Petition to Reopen and Modify Order, In re Nine West Group Inc., No. C-3937, 
(F.T.C. Oct. 30, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9810386/071106petition.pdf. 
As part of its settlement, Nine West agreed that, for ten years, it would not notify dealers in 
advance that violations of its resale price policy would subject them to temporary or partial 
interruptions in supply. Id. at 4. 
 146. See States‘ Comments, supra note 144. 
 147. See id. at 8. The states noted that Nine West‘s use of minimum RPM increased the 
prices consumers paid by an estimated $45.7 million. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. In other words, the defendant must establish that the minimum RPM agreements 
increased total sales of the product(s) at issue. 
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achieve similar results, which could in turn be refuted by the 
defendant.
150
 
In its final order, the FTC seemed receptive to the states‘ 
argument noting that ―[t]he Leegin decision may be read to suggest a 
truncated analysis, such as the one applied in Polygram Holdings, 
might be suitable for analyzing minimum resale price maintenance 
agreements, at least under some circumstances.‖151 The FTC went on 
to state, however, that two ways in which Nine West can demonstrate 
that its use of RPM will not harm competition is to show that: (1) it 
―lacks market power‖ and (2) that the ―impetus from the RPM is 
from Nine West itself and not retailers.‖152  
Since there was no evidence of retailer insistence on RPM and 
Nine West did not appear to have market power in women‘s shoes, 
the FTC granted Nine West‘s petition in part.153 The FTC provided 
the additional condition, however, that Nine West produce periodic 
reports on its use of RPM agreements to give the FTC the opportunity 
to analyze the effects of such agreements on competition.
154
 
B. The DOJ’s Structured Rule of Reason 
The second viable alternative that has arisen post-Leegin is the 
―structured rule of reason‖ standard proposed in October of 2009 by 
the Department of Justice (―DOJ‖).155 This approach, suggested by 
the Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division Christine 
Varney, proposed that RPM may be presumed unlawful after the 
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that certain ―structural 
 
 150. Id. at 9. The states suggested that as an alternative to vertical price-fixing, the 
manufacturer could require its distributors to provide services as a matter of contract and even 
pay separately for those services. If the retailer did not live up to those obligations, then the 
manufacturer could terminate or threaten termination. Id. 
 151. Order Granting in Part Petition to Reopen and Modify Order Issued April 11, 2000, In 
re Nine West Group Inc., No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410, at *6 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008). 
 152. Id. at *8. 
 153. Id. at *8–9. 
 154. Id. at *9. 
 155. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep‘t of 
Justice, Federalism: Enhancing Federal/State Cooperation, Remarks as Prepared for the Nat‘l 
Ass‘n of Attorneys Gen. (Oct. 7, 2009) [hereinafter Varney Speech], available at http://www 
.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/250635.pdf.  
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conditions‖ are present that are likely to make the RPM agreement 
anticompetitive.
156
 
The structured approach centers primarily on the four 
circumstances identified by the Leegin Court as having greater 
potential for anticompetitive effects.
157
 Under this approach, the 
plaintiff must first identify which party is the impetus for the RPM 
agreement. If the RPM agreement is manufacturer-driven, then the 
court may find it to be anticompetitive in two instances. The first 
instance is RPM imposed by the manufacturer to facilitate collusion 
by providing a means by which a cartel member can police adherence 
to their agreement.
158
  
In this situation, according to Assistant Attorney General Varney, 
a plaintiff can establish prima facie case by showing three elements: 
―(1) a majority of sales in the market are covered by RPM, (2) 
structural conditions are conducive to price coordination . . . and (3) 
RPM plausibly helps significantly to identify cheating, which would 
not be the case if wholesale prices are otherwise transparent.‖159 
The second is manufacturer-driven RPM that results in ―market 
exclusion,‖ or a manufacturer‘s implementation of RPM to guarantee 
retailers large margins and discourage them from carrying the 
products of new market entrants. In this scenario, a plaintiff can 
establish a prima facie case by showing: ―(1) the manufacturer has a 
dominant market position, (2) its RPM contracts cover a substantial 
 
 156. Id. at 8. 
 157. Id. at 9–10. The four circumstances identified by the Leegin Court include where the 
use of RPM may be anticompetitive:  
(1) when used by a manufacturer cartel to identify members that are cheating on a 
price-fixing agreement; (2) when RPM is used to organize a retailer cartel by coercing 
manufacturers to eliminate price cutting; (3) when used by a dominant retailer to 
protect it from retailers with ―better distribution systems and lower cost structures,‖ 
thereby forestalling innovation in distribution; and (4) when used by a manufacturer 
with market power to give retailers an incentive not to sell the products of smaller 
rivals or new entrants.  
Id. at 10; see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 889–92 
(2007). 
 158. Varney Speech, supra note 155, at 11. 
 159. Id. In this scenario, according to Varney, ―the first two requirements provide evidence 
that the market is structured such that collusion would be feasible because a few manufacturers 
control a majority of the market; and the third requirement would show that RPM is a plausible 
method for policing the cartel.‖ Id. at 12. 
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portion of distribution outlets, and (3) RPM plausibly has significant 
foreclosure effect that impacted an actual rival.‖160 The last 
requirement is to ensure that the alleged harm ―is not merely 
theoretical.‖161 
If, on the other hand, the RPM agreement is retailer-driven, 
Assistant Attorney General Varney suggests that courts be 
particularly wary of the restraint.
162
 The first concern is with ―retailer 
exclusion‖ where a retailer, or group of retailers with market power, 
―coerce[s] important manufacturers to institute RPM and thereby 
frustrate price competition from discount or internet retailers.‖163 In 
this scenario, Assistant Attorney General Varney proposed that the 
plaintiff could shift the burden to the defendant by establishing three 
elements: ―(1) that the retailers involved had sufficient market power, 
(2) that coercion by retailers resulted in RPM covering much of the 
market, and (3) RPM plausibly has a significant exclusionary effect 
that impacted an actual rival.‖164 
The second concern with retailer-driven RPM is possible 
collusion resulting in a cartel.
165
 According to Assistant Attorney 
General Varney, a plaintiff proceeding on a retailer collusion theory 
needs to show: ―(1) that RPM is used pervasively (e.g., at least 50 
percent of the sales in the market), (2) that RPM was instituted by 
retailer coercion (not merely persuasion), and (3) retailer collusion 
could not be thwarted by manufacturers‖ (such as by integrating into 
retailing or sponsoring new retailers).
166
 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 12–13. 
 163. Id. at 13. 
 164. Id. An example of retailer exclusion is presented in the 2009 federal district court case 
McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. Pa. 2009). In McDonough, a 
group of class action plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Babies ―R‖ Us (―BRU‖) threatened not 
to carry certain manufacturers‘ products unless the manufacturer agreed to prevent internet 
retailers from discounting them, ultimately forcing consumers to pay higher prices. Id. at 466–
67. In granting the plaintiffs‘ motion for class certification, the court found that BRU‘s alleged 
conduct preventing internet discounting, taken as true, would support a finding that BRU 
unreasonably restrained competition in light of Leegin. Id. at 491. 
 165. In other words, where retailers coerce manufacturers to use RPM to help implement 
and police a retailer cartel. 
 166. Varney Speech, supra note 155, at 13. 
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Assistant Attorney General Varney concluded by stating that in 
regulating RPM, the DOJ was ―not seeking to disrupt the traditional 
preeminent role of the FTC and the States,‖ but instead was interested 
in ―supporting a jurisprudential effort to aid the development of 
federal law under Leegin.‖167 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The Leegin Court recognized that minimum RPM can have 
procompetitive or anticompetitive effects depending on the 
circumstances in which it is employed. As such, the Court invited 
lower courts to ―establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule [of 
reason] operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the 
market and to provide more guidance to businesses.‖168 To 
accomplish this, the Court advised that lower courts ―devise rules . . . 
for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the 
rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive 
restraints and to promote precompetitive ones.‖169  
While both the DOJ‘s proposed ―structured rule of reason‖ and 
treating RPM as ―inherently suspect‖ under the PolyGram Holdings 
framework appear to satisfy the Leegin Court‘s vision, treating RPM 
as inherently suspect is the preferable alternative because of its 
greater potential to influence future judicial application. Not only 
does the ―inherently suspect‖ test have the benefit of over thirty years 
of ―quick-look‖ case law, but its application of the framework to 
vertical price-fixing fixes inherent structural defects in the traditional 
analysis. Additionally, it has the support of states, legislators, foreign 
trade partners and possibly government agencies.  
A. State and Lawmaker Support 
Perhaps the biggest supporter of treating RPM as inherently 
suspect is the states. It is no secret that the vast majority of states 
have long been in favor of keeping minimum RPM per se illegal.
170
 
 
 167. Id. at 14. 
 168. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898 (2007). 
 169. Id. at 898–99. 
 170. See Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
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While states are concerned with consumer welfare, they are equally 
apprehensive about the uncertainty of prosecuting RPM claims under 
the traditional rule of reason.
171
  
Legislators have also joined the states‘ cause with Congressional 
members in both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
introducing legislation that would effectively overturn Leegin.
172
 In 
support of this legislation, Attorneys General from forty-one states 
sent a letter to Congress contending that they ―are not aware of any 
empirical study that shows enhanced consumer welfare in the form of 
services or other consumer benefits‖ and ―reiterat[ing] the opposition 
of Attorneys General to minimum resale price-fixing.‖173  
As noted in its comments urging denial of the Nine West‘s 
petition, the states ―have a strong interest in preserving adequate 
remedies for the practice [of] . . . vertical price fixing.‖174 Absent the 
passing of legislation overturning Leegin,
175
 the states understand that 
many of their concerns can be alleviated by treating RPM as 
inherently suspect under the PolyGram Holdings framework.
176
  
 
2, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 
WL 621851 (―Dr. Miles was correct when it was decided, and remains sound today, because 
minimum RPM agreements are direct agreements to raise retail prices, and there is no evidence 
that they offer any offsetting consumer benefits.‖). 
 171. See infra note 173. 
 172. On January 6, 2009, Sen. Herb Kohl (D-WI), whose family started the Kohl‘s 
department store chain, introduced the ―Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act‖ which 
would amend Section 1 of the Sherman Act to include: ―Any contract, combination, conspiracy 
or agreement setting a minimum price below which a product or service cannot be sold by a 
retailer, wholesaler, or distributor shall violate this Act.‖ See Discount Pricing Consumer 
Protection Act, S. 148, 111th Cong. (2009–2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-148. On July 13, 2009, Rep. Henry Johnson (D-GA) introduced 
a similar bill in the House of Representatives. See Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 
2009, H.R. 3190, 111th Cong. (2009-2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/ congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=h111-3190. 
 173. Letter from Nat‘l Ass‘n of Attorneys Gen. to Members of House Judiciary Comm., 
Support for the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 3190) (Oct. 27, 2009), 
available at http://antitrustcommentary.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/letter-supporting-hr-
31901.pdf. 
 174. See States‘ Comments, supra note 144, at 2.  
 175. To date, Maryland is the only state to amend its antitrust statute to reinstate the per se 
rule of illegality for minimum RPM under state law. See MD. CODE ANN., COM LAW § 11-
204(a)(1). It is still an open question, however, as to whether Maryland‘s law is preempted by 
the Sherman Act. 
 176. See, e.g., States‘ Comments, supra note 144, at 5. 
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B. Supreme Court Precedent 
One primary reason why the states want to treat RPM as 
inherently suspect under the PolyGram Holdings framework is 
because the framework is consistent with the ―quick-look‖ rule of 
reason analyses that have already gained approval of the Supreme 
Court.
177
 While the Supreme Court has never definitively stated 
which restraints are appropriate for a quick look, the Court has 
instructed that lower courts may apply the truncated analysis based 
on their own examination of the ―circumstances, details, and logic of 
a restraint.‖178  
The ultimate goal, according to the Court, is to determine 
―whether the experience of the market has been so clear . . . that a 
confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will 
follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more 
sedulous one.‖179  
A strong argument can be made that regardless of any 
procompetitive benefits, there is a principle tendency of RPM to raise 
consumer prices.
180
 As such, it is not difficult to imagine a court 
 
 177. See, e.g., Nat‘l Soc. of Prof‘l Eng‘rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (no 
elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of 
―horizontal agreements among competitors to refuse to discuss prices‖); NCAA v. Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 (1984) (holding that ―naked restraint on price 
and output requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market 
analysis‖); FTC v. Ind. Fed‘n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 461 (1986) (holding that the ―finding 
of actual, sustained adverse effects on competition . . . is legally sufficient to support a finding 
that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even in the absence of elaborate market 
analysis‖); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that quick-look 
analysis applies ―where a practice has obvious anticompetitive effects‖); Chicago Prof‘l Sports 
Ltd. P‘ship v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n., 961 F.2d 667, 674–76 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding quick-
look analysis adequate after assessing and rejecting logic of proffered procompetitive 
justifications). 
 178. Cal. Dental Ass‘n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999). 
 179. Id. 
 180. The Leegin Court recognized as much noting that economic literature fundamentally 
agrees that vertical price fixing raises consumer prices. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. 
v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895 (2007) (higher consumer prices ―are generally consistent with 
both procompetitive and anticompetitive theories‖); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits 
of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984) (―If we assembled twelve economists and gave them 
all the available data about a business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget, we would 
not get agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers‘ welfare or economic 
efficiency more broadly defined.‖). 
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concluding that due to this tendency, a quick-look analysis putting 
the initial burden on the defendant is appropriate in cases of vertical 
price-fixing.
181
  
Because the FTC has already crafted a structured quick-look 
analysis that treats certain restraints as ―inherently suspect,‖ the states 
recognize that including vertical price-fixing in this category creates 
a convenient method of adjudication that comports not only with 
Leegin, but also with existing Supreme Court precedent. As the 
Supreme Court noted, certain restraints are more likely to be treated a 
certain way if ―rule-of-reason analyses in case after case reach 
identical conclusions.‖182 Many influential entities, including the 
states, therefore, would like to see vertical price-fixing consistently 
treated as inherently suspect. 
C. Governmental Agencies 
Since its re-introduction in PolyGram Holdings,
183
 the FTC has 
expanded application of the inherently suspect framework to new 
types of restraints.
184
 The D.C. Circuit‘s oft-cited instruction for 
determining which restraints warrant this type of treatment states the 
following: ―[T]he rebuttable presumption of illegality arises not 
necessarily from anything ‗inherent‘ in a business practice but from 
the close family resemblance between the suspect practice and 
another practice that already stands convicted in the court of 
consumer welfare.‖185 Taking this as true, it is hard to imagine any 
restraint possibly having a closer family resemblance to a convicted 
 
 181. That being said, courts have been more reluctant to take a ―quick-look‖ in recent years 
because of the Supreme Court‘s failure to definitely define the test‘s scope. The Court‘s vague 
proclamation that a quick-look analysis is only appropriate ―when the great likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained,‖ did little to instruct lower courts. California 
Dental, 526 U.S. at 770. 
 182. Id. at 781. 
 183. The framework is widely considered to have been established in the FTC‘s 1988 order 
In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988). 
 184. See, e.g., In re N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, 140 F.T.C. 715 (2005) (treating 
horizontal price-fixing arrangement as inherently suspect), aff’d, N. Tex. Specialty Physicians 
v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008); Realcomp II Ltd., No. 9320, 2007 WL 6936319 (F.T.C. 
2009) (applying inherently suspect framework to joint decisions by venturers regarding criteria 
for admission to their venture and resources). 
 185. PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
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practice than a restraint that was itself a convicted practice for ninety-
six years.  
Coupled with the fact that the FTC seems receptive to expanding 
the framework beyond horizontal restraints, it may only be a matter 
of time before the FTC treats vertical price-fixing as inherently 
suspect as well.
186
 This could go a very long way in influencing 
future judicial adjudication of minimum RPM as the courts have 
historically been willing to uphold the FTC‘s rulings on such 
matters.
187
 
Additionally, the DOJ‘s apparent willingness to work in 
accordance with, and defer to if necessary, the FTC may provide the 
states another influential ally.
188
 This is especially true if, as 
predicted, the DOJ‘s structured rule of reason is never adopted in 
practice and the DOJ‘s analyses of data tracking the effects of ―RPM 
practices implemented in the wake of Leegin‖ show a substantial 
increase in consumer prices.
189
 
D. Foreign Trade Partners 
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that many influential 
trade partners of the United States, including Canada and Europe, 
continue to treat RPM as per se or presumptively unlawful.
190
 As 
 
 186. See Order Granting in Part Petition to Reopen and Modify Order Issued April 11, 
2000, In re Nine West Group Inc., No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410, at *5 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008) 
(―The Leegin decision may be read to suggest a truncated analysis, such as the one applied in 
PolyGram Holdings, might be suitable for analyzing minimum resale price maintenance 
agreements, at least under some circumstances.‖). 
 187. See, e.g., Specialty Physicians, 528 F.3d (upholding FTC‘s inherently suspect 
framework for horizontal restraint); PolyGram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36 (upholding FTC‘s 
inherently suspect framework for horizontal restraints). 
 188. Varney Speech, supra note 155, at 14. Varney noted the DOJ‘s willingness to defer to 
other entities in Section 1 adjudication. She concluded that ―we are not seeking to disrupt the 
traditional preeminent role of the FTC and the States in this area. Rather, our interest is in 
supporting a jurisprudential effort to aid the development of federal law under Leegin.‖ Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. In Canada, for example, Section 61 of the Canadian Competition Act expressly 
prohibits discrimination or refusal to supply a product because of the buyer‘s low pricing 
policy. See Canadian Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985 c.34, § 61(1) (Can.). In the European 
Union, RPM is considered a ―hard-core‖ restraint that is presumed to be unlawful when certain 
conditions are met. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union arts. 101–2, 106, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (c 115) 47 (formerly Articles 81, 82, and 86 of 
the EC Treaty). Under a hard-core rule of reason analysis, ―the order of bringing forward 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/12
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such, courts may be willing to take into consideration the fact that 
substantive differences in competition policies of foreign trade 
partners can discourage international commerce.
191
  
Treating vertical price-fixing as inherently suspect would have 
two-pronged effect of: (1) providing a sense of certainty around 
implementing minimum price restrictions internationally;
192
 and (2) 
bringing American RPM policies closer in line with those 
international RPM policies already in place.
193
 In fact, the Leegin 
decision led one European Commission (EC) spokesman to publish 
that ―the EC hardcore approach is in a way an application of what is 
described . . . by the US Supreme Court.‖194  
Most international trade partners support convergence with 
American policies to provide a degree of certainty when trading 
internationally. Convergence remains difficult, however, if American 
courts continue to consider RPM under the traditional, unstructured 
rule of reason.
195
 As such, it would not be a surprise to see more 
influential foreign entities, such as the European Commission, come 
out in support of treating vertical price-fixing as inherently suspect. 
 
evidence and showing effects is reversed‖ to make the defendant first show ―positive effects.‖ 
Lucas Peeperkorn, DG Competition, European Comm‘n, Address at the Conference on Vertical 
Restraints in Comparative Competition Law, The Law and Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance: A Comparative Perspective (May 23, 2008) (slides from the presentation are 
available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/clge/paris-23may08/03_Peeperkorn_23may.pdf). 
 191. See Kevin J. O‘Connor, Federalist Lessons for International Antitrust Convergence, 
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2002) (asserting that the interconnection of global economy 
necessitates consistent worldwide competition policies). 
 192. In other words, businesses will know that in order to implement RPM, they will have 
the burden of proving its actual, procompetitive benefits. 
 193. See generally Luc Peeperkorn, Resale Price Maintenance and Its Alleged Efficiencies, 
4 EUR. COMP. J. 201 (2008). 
 194. Id. at 204. 
 195. For example, after Leegin was remanded by the Supreme Court, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed PSKS‘s Second Amended Complaint on the 
grounds that PSKS failed to state a claim under the rule of reason because it did not allege a 
tenable relevant market. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. CV 2:03 
107, 2009 WL 938561, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2009). PSKS unsuccessfully appealed, arguing 
that to ―simply state a claim for vertical price-fixing pursuant to the Supreme Court‘s statement 
of the rule of reason in Leegin, the plaintiff must only plead the existence of the agreement and 
the scope of its operation,‖ not any additional pleading or proof requirements. Brief of 
Appellant at 21–22, PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 2009 WL 938561 (E.D. 
Tex. Apr. 6, 2009) (No. 09-40506), 2009 WL 6479730. 
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E. Structural Defects 
Finally, while the DOJ‘s structured rule of reason does a fine job 
of setting forth the requirements necessary for a plaintiff to establish 
a prima facie case, the framework still provides courts the 
opportunity to summarily dispose of a plaintiff‘s claim from the 
outset by putting the initial burden on the plaintiff to prove the 
defendant‘s market share. Because the defendant is in a better 
position to make this showing, the DOJ‘s structured approach fails to 
correct a fundamental flaw of the traditional rule of reason analysis. 
In this regard, it is questionable whether results under the DOJ‘s 
structured approach would differ significantly from the defendant-
friendly results of a traditional rule of reason analysis.  
Under the PolyGram Holdings framework, on the other hand, 
vertical price-fixing need only be alleged before the burden shifts to 
the defendant to offer a legally cognizable competitive justification 
for the restraint. The defendant also carries the burden of showing it 
does not hold market share. This puts a greater onus on those 
imposing RPM to consider procompetitive effects and market share 
prior to implementing RPM. This could, in turn, reduce the number 
of manufacturers implementing RPM solely to increase profit 
margins and ultimately decrease litigation on the issue. 
CONCLUSION 
While the DOJ‘s structured rule of reason proposal comports with 
Leegin in theory, the proposal suffers from the same limitations as the 
vast majority of post-Leegin proposals: it is very unlikely to be 
adopted in practice. As we have seen repeatedly since Chicago Board 
of Trade, courts are not going to adopt a framework for adjudicating 
Sherman Act claims on their own accord, even if the potential 
solution is proposed by an agency as influential as the DOJ. Absent 
new guidelines from the Supreme Court or legislation overturning 
Leegin, vertical price-fixing will continue to be judged under the 
traditional, unstructured rule of reason with antitrust defendants 
prevailing in an overwhelming majority of cases. 
The only viable alternative to this outcome is to treat vertical 
price-fixing as inherently suspect under the PolyGram Holdings 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol36/iss1/12
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framework. This is because the framework carries several unique 
advantages which allow it to quickly move from being considered in 
theory to being implemented in practice. First, the PolyGram 
Holdings framework has the benefit of qualifying as a ―quick-look‖ 
rule of reason analysis that has already gained approval of the 
Supreme Court. Second, multiple federal circuit courts have upheld 
the framework as applied to other types of restraints, often citing 
quick look case law as support. Third, the FTC appears open to 
treating vertical price-fixing as inherently suspect and the DOJ 
appears open to working in accordance with the FTC. Finally, 
treating vertical price-fixing as inherently suspect already has the 
support of the vast majority of the states, many influential members 
of Congress and major international trade partners.  
The combination of these factors, coupled with the fact that the 
framework provides a structured approach that fixes the fundamental 
flaws found in the traditional rule of reason, makes treating vertical 
price-fixing as inherently suspect the most viable alternative for 
examining RPM post-Leegin. 
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